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The Underlying Causes of Military Outsourcing in the USA 
and UK 
Bridging the Persistent Gap between Ends, Ways, and Means since 
the Beginning of the Cold War 
[This is the Author Original Manuscript/AOM (pre-peer review and pre-revisions) of 
an article published by Taylor & Francis in Defence Studies on 28 February 2017, 
available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/14702436.2017.1294970.] 
Introduction 
Much has been made in recent years of the outsourcing of military 
responsibilities, a practice most commonly associated with the ‘privatisation of 
security’ and the notorious, now defunct security company Blackwater. The 
tendency to subsume the practice under the header ‘privatisation of security’ is 
understandable insofar as scholars almost exclusively study cases of private armed 
security provision. It however also exposes a weakness of the literature, namely the 
tendency to overgeneralise about the wider phenomenon of military outsourcing by 
extrapolating from the much narrower and more recent practice of private security 
contracting. Although the literature offers several functional, ideational, and 
political-economic explanations for the rapid rise of military contractors in recent 
decades, it nonetheless misses out on several broader, longer-term developments 
that were instrumental in enabling the resort to private military services and that 
furthermore long predate the turn to the private security industry. Moreover, these 
developments implicate not only defence policy and particularly acquisition, but 
also fundamental questions of foreign and security policy and policy making. 
Focusing on the USA and the UK, this article first sets out to show that the 
contemporary wave of military outsourcing stretches back to the beginning of the 
Cold War in the 1950s and not only to the demobilisation of many armed forces 
after its end in the 1990s or the neoliberal reforms introduced under and since the 
governments of U.S. President Reagan and UK Prime Minister Thatcher in the 
1980s, as the literature typically argues. Secondly, contemporary contracting will 
be shown to be most closely tied to military support functions in support of wider 
foreign and defence political objectives. Security services in both states may well 
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not have been outsourced so swiftly, if at all, without decades of experience in 
outsourcing a wide range of military logistics functions and the resultant vehicles, 
processes, and familiarities of public-private partnerships that originated there. 
The article builds its argument by way of tracing states’ foreign political 
strategies and global defence postures – ideationally and in practice – and their 
(lack of) correspondence with the state’s defence economics. These challenges to 
reconcile ends, ways, and means will be shown to be key underlying long-term 
causes of the outsourcing of military responsibilities. So far, the literature points to 
individual instances such as low troop numbers after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as 
contributing to the surge in contractualisation in specific theatres of war (see e.g. 
Kinsey 2009a, p. 33, Krahmann 2010, pp. 199-200). In reality, however, tensions 
between ends, ways, and means have existed since the 1950s. While Cusumano 
(2015) approaches this view in his examination of mobilisation constraints, he 
neglects capability gaps, expansive strategic postures, and the ideational buy-in into 
pro-privatisation logics. The strategy-resources gap has been a key contributor to 
the political and defence-economic changes which have led armies to increasingly 
turn to the private sector for support with realising their strategic objectives. 
Strategy and posture, together with their defence-economic and technological 
implementation, are thus underlying and not merely ancillary factors to these 
states’ propensity to outsource. 
This study complements the established literature in two ways. First, it 
exposes an additional, underlying layer of causal factors upon which much existing 
scholarship implicitly rests, i.e. a gap between strategic commitments, 
technological requirements for warfighting, and available resources, and these 
factors’ long-lasting impact on how states supply their armed forces and, 
ultimately, war. Being inextricably linked to the problématique of reconciling ends, 
ways, and means, this fundamentally and directly implicates the formulation of 
foreign and defence policy. Secondly, it suggests that the background and 
significance of private security contracting should be reappraised, at the very least 
insofar as Western armies are concerned, and thus a differentiation made between 
the ‘markets for force’ in these and other ‘strong’, Western states on one hand, and 
‘weak’ states on the other. This more recent phenomenon should be seen in the 
wider context of public management reform, privatisation, and military outsourcing 
rather than as a separate, essentialized phenomenon that operates somewhat 
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independently from the wider defence industry. The historical record that I discuss 
below suggests that it is closely tied up in much wider political and economic 
developments and that its expansion from the 1990s onwards likely benefited from 
the decades of experience which states and their armies had of working with 
various military service providers. From this angle, the private security industry, 
certainly in the USA and UK, appears more like the most recent stage of this 
decades-long process, and as yet another sector of the much wider public-private 
defence enterprise in which states turn to private industry than as an entirely ‘new 
beast’. All regulatory and legal idiosyncrasies arising out of the potential use of 
force by security contractors aside, scholars will be better able to understand 
security contracting, its place in military force structure, military operations, and 
the bigger picture of foreign and defence policy when viewed this way. 
The article first critically reviews key arguments in the literature about the 
drivers of military outsourcing. Next, it lays out its theoretical argument in relation 
to the existing literature, and then empirically traces the gap between ends and 
means, how this was attempted to be bridged, and the lasting impacts this has had 
on military outsourcing and the integration of contractors into military force 
structure. I conclude with an appraisal of the article’s contribution and an outline of 
avenues for future research. 
Reappraising the State of the Art on the Causes of Military Outsourcing 
In describing the history and drivers of military outsourcing, the literature 
focuses on a number of functional, ideational, and military mobilisation-based 
explanations. On a functional level, several authors agree that worldwide cuts in 
defence budgets and armed forces after the end of the Cold War released a large 
number of trained soldiers and officers to an increasingly globalised security 
market. That market went on to grow exponentially and in tandem with conflict 
levels, as both the shrunk armed forces around the world as well as international 
organisations proved unable to contain the emergence of new wars (Singer 2008, 
pp. 49-60, Avant 2005, pp. 34-38, Krahmann 2010, pp. 9-11.). States struggling to 
mobilise sufficient forces therefore turned to contractors to fill manpower shortfalls 
(Cusumano 2015). Additionally, a higher rate of technological change has been 
found to increase the propensity of contracting out support services because 
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sophisticated systems require a lot of training, infrastructure, and support, i.e. 
capabilities that increasingly reside in the market, and additionally because they are 
non-combat functions (Taylor 2004, pp. 191-193). 
The last point leads over directly to a series of ideational and ideological 
explanations about the place of the private sector in society in general and defence 
more specifically. In general terms, the more neoliberal modes of governance 
entrench themselves and the private sector is engaged in the delivery of public 
services, the more likely private industry is to also provide services to the military 
(Taylor 2004, pp. 185-186, Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, pp. 59-60. This ties in 
directly with what Singer called the ‘privatization revolution’ that strengthened and 
eventually established pro-outsourcing logics, narratives, and practises in the public 
sphere (Singer 2008, p. 49, Avant 2005, pp. 32-38.). Based on the assumption that 
the private sector displays ‘high-powered efficiency incentives’ that the public 
sector allegedly lacks, they advocate the move ‘from make to buy’ (Hartley 2011, 
pp. 233-235). This is driven not least by buying into the notion that organisations 
have ‘core competencies’ that they should focus on while outsourcing all else as far 
as possible (Taylor 2004, pp. 186-190), driving a ‘technologisation’ and 
specialisation of actors that depends on what they do, not who they are (i.e. in 
uniform or not; Abrahamsen and William 2011, pp. 5-6, Kinsey 2009b). Krahmann 
and Petersohn thus agree that ideas and norms regarding civil-military, political 
economic, and military organisation are crucial explanatory variables for the 
occurrence and variation in military outsourcing (Petersohn 2011, Krahmann 
2010). This not least explains why cuts and outsourcing occurred even when threat 
and conflict levels were high (Krahmann 2010, pp. 72-78). 
While convincing in many respects, most of these explanations suffer from 
a lack of differentiation between different military responsibilities and countries 
involved, and an over-emphasis on private security and thus the post-Cold War era 
that obscures decades of relevant preceding history. Also, inadvertently through 
omission rather than explicitly writing as much, the literature discussed above 
supports my view that these factors are not exclusive to the private security sector 
but emanate from foreign, defence, and military policy more generally. 
First, while indeed hundreds of thousands of former soldiers joined the 
regular job market after military downsizing, it is questionable whether more than a 
fraction of them ended up working for the type of global, corporate private security 
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company attracting the most attention in the literature. 1 The cases cited there 
certainly do not suggest that suddenly tens, let alone hundreds of thousands of 
former American, British, German, or Russian soldiers-turned-contractors stepped 
into the breach and intervened in conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, or elsewhere 
while states and the UN remained passive. We must thus differentiate between the 
new corporate ‘market for force’ which indeed emerged and made headlines (likely 
due to its novelty, not its size) in some ‘new wars’, and the old domestic defence-
contracting market in ‘strong states’ which had absorbed huge numbers of former 
military personnel for many decades and now simply continued doing so while 
becoming the backbone of several armies as I discuss later (on critical discussion of 
business-officer relationship see Huntington 1957, pp. 364-366, Ovendale 1994, 
pp. 14-15). 
Secondly, Singer, for instance, is aware of the logistics industry and its 
significance, but nonetheless focuses his argument on and predominantly deduces 
his key concerns from corporate combat services, a short-lived phenomenon of the 
1990s (Singer 2008, pp. 91-92, 97-100, and 151-229). Krahmann, meanwhile, 
employs the term private military companies ‘rather than referring to particular 
types of companies or services’ as her goal is highlighting the fact that contractors 
are replacing uniformed personnel and becoming key actors in civil-military 
relations (Krahmann 2010, p. 8). While this may be admissible given her specific 
research interest, it remains problematic because not every military function has the 
same impact, plays the same role, and is thus of equal importance to civil-military 
relations, military operations, and policy-making. In some cases such undue 
generalisation leads authors to misconstrue the impacts of outsourcing for instance 
on civil-military relations, arguing that uniformed personnel are losing their 
distinctive character because ‘their’ tasks are now also being provided by 
contractors and their expertise is thus no longer seen as ‘specialist.’ However, an 
army undergoing limited contractualisation is in fact designed to concentrate on 
combat, a truly exclusive function of regular army personnel. Thus, whereas in the 
past, uniformed personnel indeed fulfilled a range of tasks mirroring those to be 
found in the private sector, from engineering to running mess halls, this should now 
be decreasing, not increasing. Instead, what is becoming normalised or civilianised 
is the participation of contractors in potentially mission-critical short-of-combat 
activities (Leander 2006, p. 109). 
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Kruck took an important step towards alleviating several of these 
shortcomings by refining existing explanations and developing a sophisticated, 
nuanced, and parsimonious theory of military outsourcing. He identifies drivers 
that are specific to military domains, that broadly apply to individual countries, or 
that apply even more broadly across countries. In brief, ideas explain broader 
trends across nations, political cost calculations – such as risk transfer from the 
military to contractors – are more nation-specific, and technical or resource-
dependencies best explain the propensity to outsource a specific military capability. 
Importantly, Kruck’s theory applies sequencing to show how and that outsourcing 
becomes gradually normalised and accepted as a standard practice. This adds a 
valuable dynamic dimension to the theory and enables more long-term thinking 
(Kruck 2013, 132-6). 
A Missing Piece of the Puzzle: the Interplay between Strategy, Logistics, 
and the Politics of Defence Economics 
While Kruck’s theory went a long way towards addressing the issues 
outlined above, there remains the problem that unlike all other variables strategic 
posture and culture, defence economics and politics, and their ramifications for 
outsourcing are viewed as static givens rather than more accurately as historically 
fluid, contested, and changeable. A theory that accounts for their variability and 
incremental impact on current and future policy remains wanting. Developing such 
a theory requires an examination of which resources need mobilising and why, and 
of how this comes about politically and otherwise. It must also be done in a 
longitudinal, sequenced manner which views these factors as fundamentally 
changeable. Importantly, unlike most existing studies, it must extend back long 
before the end of the Cold War. This matters because the interplay between these 
factors appears to have been a driving force behind the increasingly systematic 
resort to contractors and their eventual formal integration into military force 
structure in the traditionally entrepreneurial USA, which faced specific resource 
pressures since the 1950s, as well as the UK, which has faced a persistent tension 
between strategic ends and resources. In line with Kruck’s argument this ultimately 
diffused ideationally and in practice to also shape how other states beyond the USA 
and the UK man, equip, train, and supply their armies (on diffusion of military 
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change and defence reform from the USA and UK across NATO see Terriff and 
Osinga 2010, p. 187). 
The argument to be developed in the remainder of this article therefore rests 
on a series of relationships between key aspects of foreign, defence, and military 
policy. It departs from a state’s strategic defence posture and commitments at a 
given time. This posture, in turn, is realised according to a particular strategic 
culture, and in our case this refers particularly to how states envisage fighting war. 
Together, these two components define the capabilities that are required to realise 
the commitments and postures in the desired manner, in particular manpower, 
technology, and training. These capabilities, finally, are generated not least through 
recruitment and procurement, and therefore hinge on the levels of resources 
available to the state. It is an historically recurring but not inevitable state of affairs 
that the available resources appear to fall short of what would ideally be required in 
order to meet the requirements and thus implement the foreign and defence 
political objectives with the posture and in the manner desired. And it is also an 
historically recurring but not inevitable observation that Western industrialised 
states – certainly the USA and the UK, which this article focuses on – (increasingly 
and repeatedly) turn to the private sector when seeking to bridge this gap between 
commitments, requirements, and resources. The remainder of this article shows 
how and why this has happened to varying degrees. 
The Longevity of Strategic Posture and Commitments in the USA and 
UK, and of their Gap with Available Resources 
Global defence postures are defined by two variables: the extent of overseas 
military presence, and the offensiveness of troops’ operational orientation along a 
spectrum from defence to power projection (Pettyjohn 2012, pp. xii-xiii). The more 
pronounced these variables are, the more expansive the posture is and the more 
likely a state is to seek support from the private sector for reaching the necessary 
levels of deployability and sustainability (Taylor 2004, pp. 190-191). Additionally, 
a posture’s longevity also matters because it can be assumed to stabilise demand for 
military capability and potentially entrench certain modes of generating capability 
for the long term. This should apply in particular when a relative lack of resources 
forces states to rethink how they operationalise their defence strategies, and when 
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the new mode then works sufficiently well to become the new standard, 
bureaucratically sanctified process. 
Foreign Policy Commitments, or: Expansive Postures 
Since the end of the Second World War, the USA and the UK have 
maintained possibly the most expansive defence postures in the world, with the 
USA maintaining this outlook to this day and the UK retreating in line with its 
relative decline in global power but nonetheless seeking the maximum posture it 
can afford. During the Cold War, an era of comparatively high certainty regarding 
the geopolitics and likely security threats, deterrence in various guises, certainly 
along the Central Front in Europe, was the strategic anchor for both (Bacevich 
2007a, p. vii). Despite having a history of global military presence since the late 
19th century, retaining a large, standing peacetime army was a novelty in the USA, 
and together with the view that a sustained overseas presence was necessary for 
national security had taken root among the security leadership (Pettyjohn 2012, pp. 
xii-xiii, 49, 61). The UK shared this basic understanding, but having to adapt to its 
changing (relatively declining) global power status while having to address two 
partly diverging loci – the colonies and the Central Front – it gradually reduced its 
overseas military presence while increasing its capacities for home-based 
deployability (Baylis 1986, pp. 19-27, Hartley 1997, p. 19, Croft et al. 2001, 38-
40). The end of the Cold War saw another expansion of postures by both; the USA 
as the sole superpower was now virtually unchallenged, while the UK embraced an 
interventionist posture with the coming-to-power of the Blair government in 1997. 
This was both partly driven and compounded by the view that ill-defined risks 
around the world demanded pre-emptive and potentially preventive military 
responses, with inaction being viewed as potentially riskier than military action 
(Coker 2002, pp. 27, 33-37, 54). Uncertainty became the key descriptor of official 
defence policy. 
Non-Negotiable Requirements: Military Superiority and Full-Spectrum 
Capabilities 
The USA has to this day maintained the view that military superiority, in 
particular through technological superiority (J. Gansler, author interview, 23 April 
2012), is the key to its global leadership role. Around the end of the Cold War, ‘a 
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new strategic consensus’ emerged in both political parties that the USA had to be 
able to ‘fight and win two major theatre wars simultaneously’ while also 
maintaining ‘overwhelming … military power to guard against the emergence of a 
future peer competitor’ (Homolar 2011, p. 214, Posen 2003). In the taxonomy of 
defence postures introduced above, the USA thus embraced one that scores high in 
both dimensions – an expansive (and, e.g. in Africa, expanding) global military 
presence that is increasingly geared towards short-notice power projection beyond 
these bases’ immediate surroundings (Pettyjohn 2012, p. 83). It finds expression in 
every strategic document published in the past decades, regardless of downward 
pressures on defence spending resulting from the ‘Peace Dividend’ or the 2008 
financial and economic crises. For instance, the 1997 U.S. Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) rested on the fundamental assumption that the USA ‘will maintain 
military superiority over current and potential rivals’ (U.S. Department of Defense 
1997, Section II, last paragraph). Then Secretary of Defense William Perry aptly 
noted that the United States, once in combat, did ‘not want a fair fight … but 
capabilities that will give [it] a decisive advantage.’ (Ibid., Secretary’s Message) 
Subsequent QDRs, National Security Strategies (NSS), and strategic guidance 
documents reiterate this view to this day, containing variations on the themes 
quoted above (Erbel 2014, pp. 68-72 and 83-86). 
The UK, while differing in its acceptance of the need to downscale in line 
with declining resources, nonetheless seeks to be as globally present and relevant as 
it can possibly be with the resources available to it (Croft et al. 2001). Crucially, at 
the same time, U.S. and UK defence planning shifted from a threat-based to a 
capabilities-based approach, affirming the de-territorialisation of strategic and 
operational outlook (U.S. Department of Defense 2001, p. 4, UK Government 
2010, pp. 9-10), and – in the case of the USA – the global scope of its ambitions. 
The title of the 2012 Strategic Guidance – Sustaining Global Leadership – speaks 
for itself (U.S. Department of Defense 2012). In brief, a retreat from their global 
position remains ‘unthinkable’ in the USA even in the face of repeated economic 
and budgetary crises and some less than satisfactory military outcomes, as its 
‘imperial’ grand strategy of global openness remains firmly in place. In the UK, 
however, this was ‘thinkable’, not least because the UK had relatively fewer 
reserves to tap into than the USA with its disproportionately bigger defence budget. 
But even the UK only cut as little and as late as possible to maintain the most 
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expansive posture it could afford, pursuing the role of ‘residual great power’ at the 
behest of the USA (cf. McCourt 2014).1 
Resources: Constantly High Demands for Capability and Manpower 
Over the course of the decades this has led to a constantly high demand for 
military capability in diverse theatres of operation, not least due to an 
‘unintentional militarism’ in the USA as a result of which the military is often the 
first foreign policy tool drawn upon in a crisis (cf. Downes 2010). As noted, that 
capability requirement is one of full-spectrum dominance in the USA and 
leadership in the UK (U.S. Department of Defense 2012, p.6, UK Army 2012, p. 
3). It centres on technological superiority across the spectrum of capabilities, 
illustrative of especially the USA’s long-held belief ‘in the virtue of technology as 
a solution for myriad tactical and strategic problems’ (Lake 2012, p. 77), and 
concomitantly the fact that U.S. grand strategy since World War II was built around 
technological superiority (J. Gansler, author interview, 23 April 2012).2 The UK 
government, similarly, recognises the centrality of technology (UK Ministry of 
Defence 2012), and has consistently opted for hi-tech equipment rather than 
sizeable armed forces when faced with budget crises (McIntosh 1990, pp. 26-30). 
Adding to this breadth is the requested ability to project these capabilities anywhere 
in the world at short notice, making ‘[overseas] projection capability is a critical 
element of … post-Cold War military strategy’ (Mears and Kim 1994, p. 40). As a 
result, not only do training requirements for soldiers rise on the one hand, as they 
have to learn to use (and sometimes maintain) new, more technologically complex 
systems, but also, on the other hand, the need for non-combat support services with 
the high sophistication of equipment and the growing transportation and global 
sustainment needs. 
                                                 
1 It is beyond the remit of this article to explore the causes of strategic longevity and its 
trajectory in depth. It should however be noted that, in addition to the ‘imperial’ grand strategy, 
the reticence to substantially alter course is also grounded in the political incentive structure of 
both states that is geared towards continuity, not change. This is examined in detail in Erbel 
2014, pp. 72-89. 
2 Gansler is, among others, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. 
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A Persistent Gap: Commitments vs. Capabilities and Resources 
There has been a strong tension between these strategic commitments and 
the concomitant high technological capability requirements on the one hand, and 
military force structure, manpower resources, and budgets on the other since the 
early days of the Cold War. High defence inflation meant that unit prices for 
military hardware rose at a real annual rate of approximately 10 percent in the UK, 
leading the country to shed self-sufficiency in military research, development, and 
production and embrace international defence procurement and partnering (Croft et 
al. p. 115). The USA, meanwhile, despite reducing manpower by 600,000 in the 
mid-1950s, increased defence spending by 20 percent from 1954 to 1959 to fund 
new air and missile systems as part their of nuclear and general deterrence strategy. 
As in the UK, the high rate of technological change made new systems rapidly 
obsolete, meaning that personnel costs for training remained very high while the 
percentage of support personnel as part of the total force rapidly grew (Stewart 
2005, p. 258). These pressures persisted throughout the Cold War and increased 
after its end when the ‘Peace Dividend’ led to reduced troop levels, the ‘Revolution 
in Military Affairs’ maintained the pressure to keep abreast of new technologies, 
and the number of military deployments grew. As a result, a smaller ‘force [had to] 
support increased power projection requirements’ (Mears and Kim 1994, p. 39), a 
condition that persists to this day. It should be noted here, and will be shown in 
more detail below, that the vast majority of personnel this refers to, including those 
whom the armed forces struggled to recruit and retain at sufficient levels, were not 
combat but combat support and combat service support troops; they were not those 
soldiers and officers providing the types of services that were later acquired from 
companies such as Blackwater. 
Bridging the Gap: Core Competency, Peacetime Budgeting, and 
Turning to the Private Sector 
Even though the gap was a constant feature, even repeated massive 
budgetary pressures and economic crises did not lead to a narrowing of either the 
strategic commitments or the technological requirements. The baseline remained 
unchanged: missions must be successfully implemented anywhere in the world, 
fielding the most advanced equipment and deploying the world’s best-trained 
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troops, even when access to the operational theatre is heavily contested. Instead, 
both the U.S. and UK governments sought to improve efficiency across the defence 
enterprise, almost always by adopting ideas, concepts, and practices tied to the 
alleged virtues of private enterprise. This took the form of streamlining military 
force structure, centralising defence management, introducing ‘managerialism’ into 
defence policy, organisation, and management, and later adopting wholesale ‘best 
business’ or ‘best commercial practices’. Ultimately, from approximately 1980 
onwards, this caused a significant increase in military outsourcing for overseas 
deployments in the wake of which contractors rapidly became indispensable. It is 
important to note that none of this was inevitable (or, for that matter, even 
necessarily the product of a deliberate, long-term, rational decision-making 
process; Novak 2009, pp. 24-25), despite the oft-repeated variations on the theme 
that ‘there is no alternative’. Instead, the defence enterprise’s trajectory since the 
1950s that has seen it (seek to) inch ever closer to resembling a private sector 
organisation is deeply embedded in wider, at least initially contested processes of 
politico-economic change in the course of which states shrunk from welfare states 
to market-states (case study of Sweden in Berndtsson 2014). 
Laying the Foundations of the ‘Market-State’ in Defence3 
Centralising defence management occurred in several waves and resulted in 
single ministries of defence that became the focal points of policy formulation and 
implementation and were closely tied to the central government, the military, and 
the defence-industrial base (Broadbent 1988, pp. 4-12). The armed services 
incrementally lost their own ministries and many prerogatives in force structure, 
research and development, and acquisition policy that were increasingly bundled in 
cross-service agencies such as the Defense Supply Agency in 1961 in the USA 
(now the Defense Logistics Agency) (Stewart 2005, pp. 202-203, 258-259, 273-
274, see also McIntosh 1990, pp. 20-21). The relative loss of influence may have 
contributed to outsourcing insofar as the military’s ability to veto certain policies 
was degraded. For instance, the U.S. Army in the 1970s had refused to outsource 
welfare and other services, seeking to ‘take care of its own’ and remain a self-
                                                 
3 See the eponymous chapter in Bobbitt 2003, pp. 213-242, for the possibly first academic use 
of the term ‘market-state’. 
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sufficient all-volunteer force (Mittelstadt 2013). By the 1980s, however, it had to 
acquiesce to the rapid expansion of outsourcing and the gradual shrinking of 
military-only service provision. 
The abolition of conscription signalled the entry of the army into the labour 
market where it had to compete with other employers for employees. In fact, the 
rationale for introducing an all-volunteer force contained at their core several of the 
key assumptions and arguments put forward by outsourcing advocates: 
organisations have core competencies (with the army’s being combat which 
explains why the U.S. Army shifted most of its support provision to the Reserves in 
the 1970s) (Stewart 2005, 388), and it is thus uneconomical and bad business 
practice to employ trained soldiers for non-combat, non-inherently governmental, 
core military tasks. The shifting of capability to the reserves had another effect that 
is particular to countries that pay for war in the way that the USA and the UK do. 
Defence budgets in both countries are appropriated for peacetime expenses, while 
the costs of war and other overseas contingencies are covered through 
supplementary budgets (USA) or the Treasury’s Reserve fund (UK). The 
outsourcing of many of these support functions from the 1980s onwards – 
importantly, including for overseas operations – was the logical conclusion of a 
budgeting tactics that sought to maintain the level of military commitments while 
reducing the ‘base budget’. Put differently, decision-makers could have their cake – 
maintain an expansive, currently unaffordable grand strategy and defence posture – 
while eating it too – cutting the main defence budget. This works regardless of how 
rare or short-term ‘contingency’ operations in fact are, and appears to have made a 
critical reappraisal of the feasibility and appropriateness of an expansive global 
defence posture less likely to happen. 
These force structure changes also abided by another logic that became ever 
more deeply entrenched in defence (and also far beyond): core competency. This, 
in turn, was part of a larger parcel of reforms through which governments sought to 
emulate market practices. This process of incremental reform of the defence 
enterprise, again, took its beginning long before the USA and UK began 
outsourcing security functions. It is commonly seen to have begun in earnest under 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the beginning of the era of the ‘whiz 
kids,’ but his policies fell on fertile ground prepared decades before when the 
second Hoover Commission advocated for the introduction of private sector 
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methods in defence after the Second World War (Hewes 1975, p. 291). Having a 
long history in the private sector and previously worked as assistant professor at 
Harvard Business School, it is unsurprising that his reforms of DoD’s organisation 
and processes drew on ‘the latest management techniques and computer systems’ 
with the aim of reducing overlap and increasing efficiency. This included the 
application of a technical approach to problem-solving that contributed to the 
gradual separation of the armed forces by function rather than Service, and formed 
part of the centralised unification of functions, e.g. in the Defense Supply Agency 
(Stewart 2005, pp. 273-274). It also meant functionalising defence as an ‘output of 
policy-making’ that was ‘susceptible to standard economic analysis’ (Ibid.), which 
is exactly that way that outsourcing would conceptualise defence, without regard 
for Service mentalities or other non-material considerations (Hartley 2011, pp. 19-
24). At the time, savings were mostly sought from the marketplace in the 
procurement of equipment, as the noted rapidly rising unit costs represented a 
significant challenge whereas conscription at the time meant that services remained 
more affordable. Nonetheless, the ideational basis for service contracting had been 
laid and became incrementally institutionalised in DoD in the following decades 
(Stewart 2005, pp. 274-276). 
The UK followed suit in 1964, when it introduced the ‘Planning-
Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS)’ that also bureaucratised defence 
decision-making and pushed for a functionalisation of defence organisation by task 
rather than Armed Service (Edmonds 1986a, p. 9). Following the Fulton Report it 
also formalised defence contracting in 1968 by creating the Review Board for 
Government Contracts, and even pondered (though did not introduce) a formalised 
‘revolving door’ to transfer defence personnel between the public and private 
sectors (Croft et al. 2001, p. 92). The recommendation, even if not implemented, 
and the broader reforms clearly illustrate the status, hopes, and weight assigned to 
the defence-industrial base in Britain as the source of rectifying the imbalance 
between commitments and resources. This belief was reiterated throughout the 
following decades, so much so that by 1992 the then Chief of Defence Procurement 
Malcolm McIntosh stated that he ‘was encouraged in a recent discussion with the 
[Confederation of British Industry] experts on partnership to learn that’ the MoD’s 
Procurement Executive often applied, as appropriate, ‘many of the techniques they 
advocate.’ (McIntosh 1992, p. 73) 
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The ideational foundations of managerialism and the belief in 
entrepreneurial superiority became increasingly unquestioned and came to 
gradually encompass military service provision. This happened most forcefully 
from 1979 onwards when the governments of both the UK and the USA pursued 
defence reform no longer by focusing predominantly on the procurement of 
equipment but also on the provision of military services both at home and overseas. 
The government of UK Prime Minister Thatcher sought to reduce equipment costs 
by privatising a number of state-owned defence enterprises, placing them in 
competition, and giving industry more leeway in how to achieve targets rather than 
micromanaging industry’s activities (Croft et al. 2001, pp. 172-178). The end of 
public ownership of defence industries can be read as a strong vote of confidence in 
the alleged superiority of private over state enterprise. It was accompanied by 
further managerial reforms and the introduction of, for instance, a New 
Management Strategy, the devolution of budgetary responsibility to the 
‘consumers’ in the MoD through the Defence Agency programme, and the public 
tender of contracts instead of procuring goods and services from trusted sellers. 
Taken together, these reforms strengthened the foundations that made the 
outsourcing of support services a standard procedure rather than an ad hoc activity, 
and thus heralded the growing role of the private sector in providing military 
services (Croft et al. 2001, pp. 93-95, 121-126, Thorn 1986, p. 61). As Matthew 
Uttley observes, the ‘broad program of UK defense management reforms since the 
1980s appears to have created structures, a ‘corporate culture’ and organizational 
incentives for MOD officials at all levels to evaluate the scope for private sector 
involvement across the defense support sector.’(Uttley 2005, pp. 29-30) By 2001, 
‘Value for Money’, ‘Best Practices’, ‘Smart Acquisition’, and ‘Teamwork with 
Industry’ had become cornerstones of British defence acquisition policy and 
practice, turning the government from an owner into a customer and hopefully 
‘smart buyer’ who micromanages less and enables industry more (UK Ministry of 
Defence 2001). 
While the USA had always drawn on contractors for some of its military’s 
support requirements, it was only in the 1980s that it gradually began to formally 
and systematically outsource the provision of support services in overseas theatres 
of operation rather than do so ad hoc. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP), one of the largest and longest-running contract vehicles of the U.S. 
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military, was created through federal legislation in 1985 (U.S. Army 1985). Around 
the same time, similar to the UK, the U.S. Army’s ‘Total Quality Management’ and 
‘Total Army Quality’ programmes sought to institute a customer mind set in the 
Service at a time of cuts in the logistics domain (Mittelstadt 2013). Throughout 
those decades, a plethora of public and private initiatives set about entrenching the 
self-perception of the state as a customer of private services. Be it through lobbying 
and networking efforts by industry groups such as the Professional Services 
Council and Business Executives for National Security, task groups of the various 
defence boards to implement a ‘culture of savings’ through behavioural change in 
DoD that emulates the private sector, or the statutory obligation of DoD to follow 
‘smart acquisition’ mandates passed in various National Defense Authorization 
Acts (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, U.S. Congress 2013, Section 823, and on 
politics of military outsourcing see Erbel 2016)– managerialism, small government, 
the ‘new public management’, and a preference for private enterprise became ever 
more deeply institutionalised in both the U.S. and UK defence policy domains. 
Deliberate, but not Inevitable: Continuing on Paths Well-Trodden 
It bears repeating that all these developments well pre-date the outsourcing 
of security-related functions to incorporated companies that started in earnest after 
9/11, and that all of these initiatives and reforms sought efficiencies at the ‘tail end’ 
of the army, i.e. the support end comprising areas such as logistics, operation and 
maintenance of equipment, and feeding of troops. The processes outlined above 
over the course of at least three decades laid the foundations of the status quo in 
which managerialism and far-reaching contractualisation are all but unquestioned 
in the USA and the UK. These foundations, however, were sometimes more 
ideational than operationalised on the ground; tentative, and disputed. It was 
therefore only in the 1990s, when governments led by the previous opposition 
parties confirmed and in fact accelerated the previous policy trajectory, that the 
current status quo became firmly established. Only in the 1990s was the 
remoulding of defence in the image of business transformed from a partly 
implemented idea and a policy proposition into an institution and policy standard. 
At the critical juncture that emerged with the end of the Cold War, the 
disappearance of the Soviet Bloc, and the significant reductions across the armed 
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forces (the ‘Peace Dividend’), the USA and the UK did not think about bridging 
the persistent gap between commitments and resources – which became even more 
pressing as the number of military operations grew rather than shrank in the 1990s 
– by significantly retreating from the world stage, reducing their commitment to 
cutting-edge military technology, or increasing the number of recruits. Instead, with 
the victory of capitalism and liberalism, they invested wholesale into the core 
competency model and continued to bolster their national defence industries by 
increasing the mutual dependency between state and industry that made a reversal 
more difficult by the day. Put differently, while the stage had been set over the past 
decades, the most recent developments after the Cold War were not an historical 
necessity but instead resulted from deliberate decisions to continue on a trajectory 
that entailed further investment in the belief that business could produce and 
provide services more efficiently and flexibly than government (even though no 
systematic evidence had been available at the time) (Avant 2005, p. 32, Novak 
2009, pp. 24-25). The rapid growth of security contracting falls into this specific 
period of time with its particular political and economic context. 
In the USA, the consolidation of the defence industry after 1990 meant that 
a shrinking number of large companies became even more heavily dependent on 
U.S. government procurement than in the past. Since the defence-industrial base in 
the USA is viewed as a producer of security, challenges to its industry are thus 
challenges to its national security. This prompts the U.S. government to invest 
more effort into ensuring its national defence industry’s survival and sustaining its 
inflow of business (U.S. Department of Defense 2010b). The Commission on Roles 
and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) was set up in 1994, and – like many 
previous efforts at reforming U.S. defence spending and improving efficiency – 
recommended reducing ‘the cost of the support infrastructure through increased 
outsourcing and better management’ (U.S. Department of Defense 1995, pp. 2-3 of 
the Executive Summary). The CORM was not very amenable to asking whether or 
not outsourcing was a good decision per se, but appeared to have received the 
‘marching orders—outsource!’ (F. Camm, personal correspondence, 5 September 
2012).4 The CORM’s strong endorsement of contractualisation is deeply steeped in 
                                                 
4 Camm is a Senior Economist at the RAND Corporation and was involved in the wider CORM 
process. 
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the notion of core-competency, urging DoD to ‘concentrate service efforts on 
military core competencies’ (U.S. Department of Defense 1995, Chapter 2, p. 20). 
Subsequent high-policy document picked up and formalised this interpretation of 
military force structure, with the Secretary of Defense noting in the 1997 QDR that 
in order ‘[to] preserve combat capability and readiness, the Services have targeted 
the reductions by streamlining infrastructure and outsourcing non-military-essential 
functions.’ (U.S. Department of Defense 1997, Secretary’s Message) The 2010 
QDR still had to contend with the same force structure problems, seeking to come 
up with the appropriate mix for the defence workforce that now formally comprises 
military, civilian, and contractor personnel (U.S. Department of Defense 2010a, p. 
55). 
The UK, similarly, focused its defence reform efforts on improving its 
‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio, that is the relative firepower of its uniformed troops, by 
prioritising spending on combat forces and their equipment while shifting support 
and technological tasks to the private sector. This trend, epitomised in the dictum of 
the eponymous report ‘Front Line First’ of 1994, took the form of public-private 
partnerships and ‘Private Finance Initiatives’ as ways towards core competency 
(Laurent 1991, p. 88, Krahmann 2010, pp. 237-248, Hartley 1997, pp. 21-22, Croft 
et al. 2001, p. 22). 
Each of these initiatives makes unmistakably clear that the unwavering 
demands for technological superiority and global military dominance (USA) or 
leadership (UK) underpinned the developments above. An oft-cited DSB report in 
1996, ‘chartered to develop recommendations on ways DOD could use outsourcing 
as an important tool to free up substantial funds to support defense modernization 
needs’, advised the government to contract out ‘all DoD support functions … 
except those … which are inherently governmental, are directly involved in 
warfighting, or for which no adequate private sector capability exists or can be 
expected to be established.’ (U.S. Department of Defense 1996, Accompanying 
Memo, emphasis added) Had either state been willing to proceed with less 
sophisticated equipment or a significantly less expansive posture, their defence 
establishments may not have been compelled to go down the route of core 
competency, knowledge transfer out of the military, the strong investment in new 
military vogues such as the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, and the concomitantly 
increasing outsourcing. Instead, the charter’s formulation makes clear that core 
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competency and further privatisation were now the point of departure for future 
defence reform, no longer merely an option among others. Both the USA and the 
UK went on to increasingly contract out the support of their equipment to the 
original manufacturer or other industry providers throughout a system’s life-cycle 
through vehicles such as ‘performance-based logistics’ that – in the USA – are now 
mandated by law to be applied (U.S. Congress 2013, Section 823) The UK, 
meanwhile, even goes so far as to buy an asset’s capability (e.g. hours of air-to-air 
refuelling capability) rather than buy the asset outright (e.g. an air-to-air refuelling 
aircraft) (see e.g. UK Royal Air Force). Both states, moreover, are exploring (the 
USA) or implementing (the UK) new military force structures which have one 
theme in common – the support end of every future military deployment will 
comprise a sizeable number of private contractors.5 
Importantly, the CORM merely mentions ‘base security’, i.e. static 
protection of military installations, as an area in which outsourcing could be 
expanded in the future (U.S. Department of Defense 1995, Chapter 3, p. 2), and the 
DSB report makes no mention of security contracting at all in its discussion of 
dozens of areas that are being outsourced already or should be considered for 
contractualisation (U.S. Department of Defense 1996, pp. 58-64). Instead, it is the 
support service sector that is repeatedly highlighted as providing the largest 
potential for savings and fresh expertise (for the government) and profit 
opportunities (for the private sector). It is also sufficiently non-inherently 
governmental as far as the use of violence is concerned. It was therefore the most 
attractive target during the outsourcing initiatives of the 1990s, as it engendered 
least resistance and ran into the fewest obstacles. 
Nonetheless, these reports also fall into the time in which some seminal 
works on private security locate the emergence of the ‘market for force’ and the 
‘privatized military industry’ as distinct objects of study, and so this point warrants 
further consideration (cf. Avant 2005, Singer 2008). Formerly suppressed conflicts 
erupted after the end of the Cold War and states turned to the new, globalising 
market in order to enhance their military capabilities. Some security contractors in 
the 1990s provided quasi-mercenary services in Africa and have now mostly 
                                                 
5 These are the Joint Logistics Enterprise in the USA and the Total Support Force in the UK, 
see U.S. Department of Defense 2010c, and UK Ministry of Defence 2010. 
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disappeared or retreated into the shadows, while other companies were hired to 
provide training and capacity-building for weak states’ armies and stuck around. 
These events accord with my view that a gap between ends and means within a 
certain strategic and political-economic context drives the contractualisation of 
military services; in this case, a security market had become available (in an era of 
military downsizing, accelerated globalisation, and sweeping privatisation) to states 
affected by civil war. Moreover, most of these cases did not involve the USA, UK, 
or other Western states, and when they did, for instance MPRI’s oft-cited advising 
contract in Croatia, contractors were hired for non-combat tasks and to circumvent 
political obstacles that prevented uniformed U.S. personnel from providing the 
service in question (a strategic gap of sorts not unlike that sometimes faced during 
the Cold War that lead to the use of mercenaries in the past).6 
The larger-scale recourse to private security contractors by the USA and 
UK only truly came about after 9/11. The outsourcing of all non-inherently 
governmental, non-core competencies and functions – as a matter of principle – 
had been absorbed by the political mainstream, and the catastrophically 
understaffed wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had recreated, on the operational level, 
the now-familiar gap between ends and means, including in the security sphere. 
Not least due to political and capability restraints, especially manpower caps, it was 
sought to be overcome yet again by outsourcing, in this case through the 
deployment of an unprecedented number of contractors into active warzones where 
they for many years outnumbered uniformed personnel. But even then and there, 
security contractors always were and remain only a small minority of the overall 
contractor workforce on the ground, and are included alongside other contractors in 
overall manpower counts (on Iraq see Kinsey 2009a, for statistics see Schwartz and 
Swain 2011, pp. 7, 10, 13, 15, 24, and Peters et al. 2015). 
Viewed from this angle, private security contractors – certainly in the West 
– appear as yet another attempt at bridging the gap between ends and means, 
                                                 
6 For more on such use of military contractors, see Mohlin 2012. While bearing some 
similarities with the use of mercenaries and combat-prone ‘advisors’ during the Cold War, 
especially the circumvention of political opposition to interference in civil wars as well as 
ensuring ‘plausible deniability’ of any involvement, companies such as MPRI and the training 
and advisory services they provide fall into a significantly different category than the 
mercenarism of the past, not least their legal status and contractual relationships, but also the 
nature of their employees and their non-participation in offensive combat operations. On the use 
of mercenaries and ‘advisors’ during the Cold War, see Voß 2016. 
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broadly in line with the many other examples discussed in this article. Their rise 
came about somewhat haphazardly, not least due to the unexpected collision of 
defence budget cuts and increases in global military activity – i.e. an exacerbation 
of the ends-means-gap – which met a political environment that advocated and 
even mandated the maximum shrinking of the public sector (not least by 
outsourcing as many functions as possible), and that coincided with the rapid 
expansion of the global trade in services. Put differently, the underlying drivers of 
security contracting did not differ fundamentally from the structural dynamics that 
drove the piecemeal process towards contractualisation in the USA and UK since 
the 1950s.7 The resulting problems and challenges associated with non-state use of 
force – regulation, oversight, and accountability – may well differ, but not enough 
to warrant the singularity awarded to private security contracting as a whole. 
Instead, security contractors should be viewed as forming a part of the total force 
package that combines regular troops and contractors on deployments, or as 
occasionally serving as proxies when regular troops cannot deploy but there is 
political determination to influence events on the ground. Viewing security 
contracting from this angle enables us to both more fully and nuancedly appreciate 
the reasons for and rationale behind their recruitment, their place in military force 
structure and operations, as well as the particular challenges they pose for public 
policy and administration. Importantly, it enables a comparative examination that 
much more fully understands not only the differences but also the commonalities 
behind states’ recourse to the full range of military service providers. As such, 
therefore, the factors laid out in this paper explain both the early recourse to private 
contractors as well as the creation and structure of an environment in which 
eventually even protective security tasks – alongside a wide range of other military 
responsibilities – were gradually outsourced by formerly militarily self-sufficient 
states to private contractors. 
                                                 
7 The resort to security contractors elsewhere is less clear cut as it spans the range from quasi-
mercenarism to the neoliberal purchase of capability on the more regulated, international 
market. See Dunigan and Petersohn, eds, 2015, for a more systematic breakdown of the 
emergence and typology of markets for force in the world. 
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Conclusion and Outlook 
This article set out to make two main points. First, a state’s strategic posture 
can be conceptualised as part of a deep, underlying layer of drivers of military 
outsourcing. Depending on its interplay with ideational factors, such as the 
proclivity for neoliberal political economics, strategic culture and the conduct of 
war, and the need to subsidise a domestic defence-industrial base, it can accelerate 
or decelerate the emergence of and the turn to private military service providers. 
Secondly, the article sought to rectify the persistent but unconvincing approach of 
the literature that seeks to generalise about the wider phenomenon of military 
outsourcing by basing itself on the private security sector. As was shown, not only 
the ideational basis for outsourcing but also the first (and the largest) contract 
vehicles were located in the logistics area. This was already at the height of the 
Cold War when outsourcing security was not even near the political agenda. The 
expanded outsourcing of security after the Cold War came at a time when the 
combined forces of uncertainty in the security environment, defence cuts, and the 
global sweep of the privatisation paradigm yet again exacerbated the gap between 
ends and means, and met with a political and economic environment in which for 
many years there had been advocacy and government reform aimed at outsourcing 
– by default – all non-inherently governmental functions. The end of the Cold War, 
then, did not spark wide-spread military contracting, but instead merely represented 
the beginning of the latest stage of a much longer process that had set in in the very 
early days of the Cold War. This stage was defined by the doubling-down on the 
driving forces which, at its peak, swept up the security domain in the understaffed 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is certainly reasonable to assume that governments 
would have been more hesitant to outsource responsibilities that potentially involve 
the use of force had they not had several decades of experience in gradually relying 
more and more on the private sector for the implementation of their defence 
policies, and had they not been both externally lobbied and internally working to 
shrink the government to perform only inherently governmental functions and 
focus on core competencies. 
We can therefore better understand both the occurrence, significance, and 
scale of military outsourcing when placed in this wider historical and conceptual 
context. Security contracting more specifically then appears less like an entirely 
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‘new beast’ and instead more like yet another subset of contracting for military 
capability as has been done for decades in various other domains. Moreover, by 
appreciating the significance of foreign policy, defence postures, strategic cultures, 
and the political economy for military outsourcing, we can move forward two 
debates. First, the debate about the causes, appropriateness, and future trajectory of 
military outsourcing can take a much more holistic perspective when it is aware of 
the full range of relevant factors behind the phenomenon, as can the debate about 
making foreign and defence policy in the current climate of strategic uncertainty, 
rapid technological change, and economic instability. For instance, for those 
wishing to curtail the practice, simply passing a memo that seeks to propel 
government agencies to insource functions that currently reside in the private sector 
– as was done in the USA in 2009 and rescinded in 2010 – is unlikely to do the 
trick (U.S. Department of Defense 2009). What is required instead is a more 
holistic awareness that understands that outsourcing is not the root political issue 
but a consequence of the state’s desire to draw on a relatively self-sufficient 
defence-industrial base, to maintain military and technological superiority and 
dominance, and the ostensible need to maintain a global, forward-leaning posture. 
Second, the same applies to another area of study that for reasons of space was not 
addressed here but that deserves attention, namely the politics of military service 
contracting. Ideas such as national roles (e.g. superpower, great power), superiority 
of private enterprise, core competency and so on do not operate on their own, but 
are embraced by policy entrepreneurs, policy-makers, and bureaucrats (among 
others) and repeatedly operationalised in the policy process. How this is done and – 
more importantly – sustained over decades to create the status quo (which has been 
shown to be not inevitable but historically contingent) represents yet another piece 
of the puzzle that has received minimal attention in the past decade and a half when 
research into the ‘privatisation of security’ took off (Erbel 2014). 
Future research should therefore consider branching out in two directions. 
First, as was done in this paper, it ought to expand the range of contractualised 
military responsibilities beyond security, and, secondly, go beyond Western states 
when studying the phenomenon of military outsourcing. These steps enable us to 
build both a more comprehensive, variable, and thus generally applicable 
understanding of the practice, and to test our assumptions about the relationship 
between state, their posture, strategic culture, political economy, and defence 
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economics on one hand, and military outsourcing on the other (recent examples are 
Dunigan and Petersohn, eds, 2015, Berndtsson 2014). Future research could then 
either approximate a more universal theory of military outsourcing or, alternatively, 
geographically and/or empirically further specify and delimit existing explanations 
und understandings. Such efforts promise to remain timely: With budgetary 
pressures persisting, technology advancing, and foreign policy objectives 
remaining global and ambitious, the debate about how states can achieve their 
international objectives will equally endure. I hope to have shown that neither the 
pressures nor the (foundations of) many of the responses to them are as new as they 
might at times appear, but that they have in fact been surprisingly stable features 
since the beginning of the Cold War. 
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